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I. Introduction
It is no coincidence that the capital markets law we know
today owes much of its existence to a financial crisis. Black
Friday, October 24, 1929, prompted President Roosevelt to lay the
foundations of United States capital markets law with the
Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (SEA).' Important features of these two statutes were then
adopted in the rest of the world.2 They were adopted, for example,
in Europe in the 1970s. Moreover, United States law is not known
for its systematic structure; rather, statutes are often developed as
ad hoc reactions to crises. However, it is distinguished by a
number of features, for example the fact that legislative
competence for capital markets law rests with the federal
government, while that for corporations law rests with the states.
I Besides the introduction of the Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities
Exchange Act 1934 (SEA) by President Roosevelt, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] also
constitutes such a statute. On financial crises, see generally JAMEs D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3-7 (6th ed. 2006); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S.
ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (1st ed. 2009);

on the SOX, see generally Thomas M. J. M6llers, Creating Standards in a Global
FinancialMarket - The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other Activities: What Europeans and
Americans could and should learn from each other, 4 EUR. Co. & FIN. L. REv. 173
(2007).
2 See M61lers, supra note 1.
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Another peculiarity, generous in comparison to Europe, is the
general approach of leaving problems for the market to solve, as
the market is perceived to have regulatory solutions more readily
available than the legislature.
The Member States of the European Union are home to a
corporations law that is relatively mature,' but a capital markets
law that is in relative infancy at only 20 years old.4 As a result of
this, capital markets law is only taught at some European
universities. Nonetheless, thousands of statutory provisions have
arisen, so that it is already difficult to maintain an overview of
them.'
The current financial crisis has made clear the "fragility" of the
financial markets in recent times. In the forum of the G20, efforts
have been made to find the weak points and to react to them. The
3 On the history of German corporations law, see generally WERNER SCHUBERT &
PETER HOMMELHOFF, HUNDERT JAHRE MODERNEs AKTIENRECHT: EINE SAMMLUNG VON
TEXTEN UND QUELLEN ZUR AKTIENRECHTSREFORM 1884 MIT 2 EINFOHRUNGEN (De
Gruyter Recht, 1985) and WERNER SCHUBERT & PETER HOMMELHOFF (EDS.), DIE
AKTIENRECHTSREFORM AM ENDE DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK (De Gruyter Recht, 1987).

4 See, e.g., Klaus Hopt, Europdisches Kapitalmarktrecht - Riickblick und
Ausblick, in SYSTEMBILDUNG UND SYSTEMLIJCKEN IN KERNGEBIETEN DES EuROPAISCHEN
PRIVATRECHTS 307, 307-11 (Stefan Grundmann ed., 1999); On the development of the
much older stock exchange law, see generally Hanno Merkt, Zur Entwicklung des

deutschen

Bdrsenrechts

von

den

Anfdngern

bis

zum

zweiten

Finanzmarktfdrderungsgesetz,
in
BORSENREFORM:
EINE
OKONOMISCHE,
RECHTSVERGLIECHENDE UND RECHTSPOLITISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG 17 (Klaus Hopt et al.
eds., 1997).

5 See Datenbank zum deutschen und europdischen Wirtschaftsrecht, THOMAS M.J.
MOLLERS, http://www.thomas-moellers.de (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). On the three-tier
organization at the national and European level, see Thomas M.J. M611ers, "Europaische
Methodenund
Gesetzgebungslehre
im KapitalmarktrechtVollharmonisierung,
Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des Lamfalussy-Verfahrens als Mittel zur
Etablierung von Standards," [2008] ZEuP 480; Thomas M.J. M61lers,

Vollharmonisierung im Kapitalmarktrecht -

Zur Regelungskompetenz nationaler

Gerichte undParlamente,in Vollharmonisierung im Privatrecht 247, 253 (Beate Gsell &
Carsten

Herresthal

eds.,

2010)

[hereinafter

Millers,

Vollharmonisierung im

Kapitalmarktrecht].
6 See, e.g., G-20, London Summit, Progress report on the actions of the
Washington actionplan (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://g20.org/Documents/FINAL Annexon ActionPlan.pdf

[hereinafter

G-20,

London Summit]; G-20, PittsburghSummit, Progress report on the actions to promote
financialregulatoryreform (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129866.pdf

[hereinafter

G-
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novel feature of this process is that those involved possess the
serious intention of creating uniform regulations at the
international level. The following article seeks to sketch out some
current flaws in capital markets law, in order to identify areas that
need future action. To this end it might help to structure capital
markets law more clearly than in the past. A distinction is sought
to be made in this discussion between (I) market participants, (II)
the financial products and information on listed companies, and
(III) the relevant financial services of financial intermediaries.
The final discussion will then deal with (IV) implementation and
enforcement measures and (V) the legal methodology of capital
markets law. In the process, the positive developments in capital
markets law will be discussed, but above all gaps in investor
protection will be addressed. Individual problems will be left for a
deeper analysis in the future.
II. Market Participants
1. Privateand ProfessionalInvestors
In banking and capital markets law, listed companies stand
before a market that consists of both retail and professional
investors. A third group, so-called "financial intermediaries,"
gathers information about these companies and evaluates it. The
Markets in FinancialInstruments Directive (MiFID) has made a
distinction between professional and private investors. A different
standard is set for these two groups, and numerous duties of
disclosure are reduced for the former.' This is a convincing
approach, as the alternative would give rise to transaction costs by
imposing information paternalistically on informed investors.'
However, the financial crisis demonstrates that even the
(purportedly) professional Landesbanken9 were not professional

20, Pittsburgh Summit]; G-20, St. Andrews Summit, Progress report on the economic
actions ofLondon, Washington, andPittsburgh(Nov. 7, 2009),
http://g20.org/Documents/20091107_progress-report-standrews.pdf [hereinafter G-20,
St. Andrews Summit].
7 See Art. 4(1), no. 11, in comparison with Annex I of the MiFID, transposed in
§31(9) and §31a(2) WpHG.
8 see FRANZ CLEMENS LEISCH, INFORMATIONSPFLICHTEN NACH § 31 WPHG 163
(C.H. Beck 2004).
9 Landesbanken is a group of state owned banks unique to Germany. They are
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enough to accurately calculate the risks inherent in financial
products.'o Numerous municipal treasuries are complaining about
insufficient disclosure." Since they are professional investors,
many of the duties imposed under Section 31 of the Securities
TradingAct (WpHG) do not apply.' 2
2. Largerand Smaller Listed Companies
European capital markets law is also full of gaps. Many
disclosure obligations only apply to the regulated market, not to
the curb market [Freiverkehr], such as the Entry Standard on the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange or the over-the-counter markets of the
other regional stock exchanges.' The size of the listed companies
correlates clearly with the different "market segments" of the
exchange, such as the DAX, MDAX, SDAX and the Prime
Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 4 The three large
exchanges in Europe all solicit small companies. The curb market
has the advantage for small companies that it is not subject to strict

regionally organized and their business is predominantly wholesale banking. They are
also the head banking institution of the local and regional bases Sparkassen or saving
banks. See Michael Gruson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995
COLUMB. Bus. L. REV. 337, 339-40 (1995).
10 See G-20, London Summit, supra note 6; G-20, PittsburghSummit, supra note 6;
G-20, St. Andrews Summit, supra note 6.
11 Above all the Deutsche Bank is the subject of numerous claims. See, e.g., OLG
Naumburg judgment of Mar. 24, 2005, 28 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 1313; OLG
Bamberg judgment of May 11, 2009, 23 Wertpapier- Mitteilungen 1082; OLG Celle
judgment of Sept. 30, 2009, Betriebsberater2265.
12 See Bundesministerium ffir Justiz, Begriindung Regierungsentwurf zum
Finanzmarktrichtlinie Umsetzungsgesetz, BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 16/4028, at 66
(Sept. 27, 2006); Ingo Koller, Commentary on §31a, in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ
KOMMENTAR
3 (Otto Schmidt, 2009); cf Hannes Bracht Kommunen als geeignete
Gegenparteien im Handel mit Derivaten nach dem FinanzmarktrichtlinieUmsetzungsgesetz, 30 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 1386, 1388 (2008).
13 See RODIGER VON ROSEN, GATEWAY TO EUROLAND: THE GERMAN FINANCIAL
MARKETPLACE-CENTRE OF EuRO AREA CAPITAL MARKETS, 12 (2003), available at
http://www.dai.de/internet/dai/dai-2-0.nsf/0/A7AAF8D6D295OEO4C125747C0055904E/
$FILE/5D8F7F9838EA12CACl25747C0053B257.pdfopenelement&cb

utf=Gateway%20to%20Euroland.pdf.
14 See
DIRK
DOHSE
&
SVEN-CHRISTIAN

contentname

STEUDE,
CONCENTRATION,
COAGGLOMERATION AND SPILLOVERS: THE GEOGRAPHY OF NEW MARKET FIRMS IN
GERMANY 2 (43rd European Congress of the Regional Sci. Ass'n 2003), available at
http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersalersaconfs/ersa03/cdrom/papers/230.pdf.

62

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. XXXVI

reporting and disclosure requirements of the regulated market, and
avoid the costs associated therewith. A number of disadvantages
arise for smaller companies on the capital markets, which make
the curb market segment more attractive. Smaller companies often
cannot afford large investor relations departments to maintain the
company website and provide financial analysts, funds and other
investors with regular information. In addition, large investment
services providers seldom produce financial analyses of small
listed companies. Finally, the securities of these companies are
traded far less relative to larger companies.
In turn, fewer turnovers of securities invite price
manipulation." Even with so-called "spam emails," retail investor
"ripoffs" are not seldom. "Wild West" manners still remain to a
certain degree, which is hardly beneficial to capital markets as an
institution. The potentially higher risk of insider trading and
market manipulation of the values of smaller listed companies,
caused by their lower level of market capitalization, has not yet
provoked an adequate legal response. While it is traditionally the
larger market segments that have been regulated and supervised, in
the future a better supervision of the trading values of smaller
listed companies by the exchanges and the Federal Supervisory
Authority, the Bundesanstalt filr Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(BaFin), appears desirable.16
3. FinancialIntermediaries
Investors depend on the expertise of financial intermediaries
such as rating agencies, financial analysts and investment services
providers, and rely on the information they produce. Duties of
disclosure still constitute the main instrument of capital markets
law.' 7 In contrast to prohibitions, duties of disclosure have the
15 See Holger Fleischer, Stock-Spams-Anlegerschutz und Marktmanipulation, 3
ZBB 137 (2008).
16 According to information from the responsible departments, the BaFin has been
directing particular attention to these problems recently. This increased pressure appears
to have been effective at reducing the number of relevant delicts.
See also,
Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [hereinafter BaFin], Jahresbericht2008
at 156 (Bonn 2008).

See also, KLAUS J. HOPTETAL., BORSENFERFORM 372 (1997).

17 See Thomas M. J. M61lers, The Progress of German Information Disclosure
Requirements: A Comparative Law Perspective in Light of Recent Developments in
EuropeanCapital Markets Law, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 279, 282-3 (2004).
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advantage that the transactions concerned are allowed subject
"only" to a duty to provide an explanation of the risks involved."
Surprisingly, conflicts of interest are not dealt with in the relevant
textbooks as a general instrument of capital markets law. 9 This
notwithstanding, the avoidance, or at least disclosure, of conflicts
of interest is not just a duty of the banks towards their clients2 0
organized within the framework of their compliance regime,2 1 but
also gives rise to duties incumbent on financial analysts,2 2 rating
234
agencies2 and accountants.2 4 It seems one could expand on this
approach further - misleading disclaimers are to be forbidden.2 5
Breaches of these rules ought to give rise to civil causes of action.
III. Financial Products and Information from Listed
Companies
1. Complex FinancialProducts - Prohibition,Approval and
Transparency
Banks, especially investment banks, are innovative.

While

shares, as a dominant form of security, and corporate bonds used
to dominate the market, in recent years countless new financial
products have appeared, not only to save taxes, but to generate
new markets, new trade, and new profits. Common examples
include put- and call-options, as well as derivatives, short sales,

18 Id.
19 For examples of this not being addressed, see, e.g., PETRA BUCK-HEEB,
KAPITALMARKTRECHT (C.F. Miller, 2006); CARSTEN PETER CLAUSSEN, BANK- UND
BORSENRECHT (C.H. Beck 2008);
SIEGFRIED KOMPEL
& RODIGER VEL,
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Erich Schmidt, 2006).

20 WpHG §31(2) No. 2.
21 WpHG §33(1) No. 3.
22 WpHG §34b(1) No. 2; see also Thomas M.J. Mollers, Effizienz als Mafistab des
Kapitalmarktrechts - Die Verwendung empirischer und okonomischer Argumente zur
Begriindungzivil-, straf-und offentlich-rechtlicherSanktionen, 208 AcP 1 (2008).
23 Article 5, Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Counsel on Credit Rating Agencies, at 20 COM 704 (Nov. 11, 2008); see also Thomas
M.J. M6llers, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies: the new US and EU law - important
steps or much ado about nothing?, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 477 (2009).
24 Council Directive 2006/43 art. 22(22), 2006 O.J. (EC) (on the statutory audits of
annual accounts and consolidated account).
25 For such a disclaimer, see Thomas M.J. M61lers & Florian Holzner, Die
Offenlegungspflichten des Risikobegrenzungsgesetzes, 11 NZG 166, 171 (2008).
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including naked short sales, and structured products such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS). As a result of these developments,
products are no longer fully understood by buyers, whether retail
investors or professional investors.26 As such, the benefits and
risks of the financial product cannot be properly calculated.27
Additionally, complex financial products such as the CDO have
given rise to certain risks.28 Residential mortgages were given to
non-creditworthy clients, but the risks of these mortgages were not
recorded on the books of the bank itself; rather they were
transferred to third parties via the financial markets.2 9 Lastly,
market fluctuations were intensified by speculation on rising or
falling prices by the means of certain financial products.30 A wellknown example is that of the Volkswagen shares, which in autumn
of 2008 were driven up to C1,000 within a short time, but then fell
back down to E200. 31
In particular, two regulatory mechanisms of capital markets
law may be triggered here. On one hand, it must be discussed
which products should be prohibited or allowed in more limited
quantity and only with the approval of a regulatory authority.3 2
Certainly the industry's livelihood lies, in part, in its constant
creation of new and "innovative" financial products. Opportunity
and risk are by nature bound together. Investors should just
"gamble" on the market on a large scale, however, only when they
are prepared to lose their investment. For this reason, future
26 See Gretchen Morgenson, Investors in mortgage-backed securitiesfail to react
available at
2007),
18,
(Feb.
TIMES
N.Y.
market plunge,
to
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/business/worldbusiness/18ihtmorgenson.4633573.html.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 David Gaffen, Volkswagen's Bizarre Trading Bug, THE WALLSTREET JOURNAL
(Oct. 7, 2008) http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/10/07/volkswagens-bizarre-tradingbug/.
32 Similar discussions are found in competition law.
See, e.g., Wolfgang
Fikentscher, Finanzkrise, Wettbewerb und Regulierung, 9 GRURINT 615 (2009); Joseph
Straus & Simon Klopschinski, Der Schutz von Geschaftsmethoden und andere
patentrechtliche Fragestellungen im Lichte der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER MES 327 (Gereon Rother et al. eds., 2009).
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products should be prohibited which require no capital investment
and which, because of extreme leverage effects, do more harm
than good. WpHG Section 37g provides a good approach: under
this section, the Federal Ministry of Finance can release
regulations on the basis of which certain financial products can be
prohibited. Unfortunately, use has not yet been made of this
provision. Fortunately, however, short selling has been prohibited
in the United States and by the BaFin in Germany, because this
practice can cause the market to rise or fall without the actual
investment of capital."
Additionally, CDOs should only be
allowed in the future if the trading partner assumes some risk of
his own. For retail investors, limitations are already in place,
namely that discount broking is only permissible for non-complex
financial instruments.34 In a recently passed law, the German
legislature prohibited naked short sales and certain trades with
derivatives. 5 This approach is inappropriate because alternatives
were not discussed sufficiently: the non-stock market trade could
also be transferred to the stock market or to multilateral trading
facilities (MTFs). Alternatively, "failures to deliver"3 6 caused by
naked short sales could be reduced by additional measures.37
33 On July 15, 2008, the SEC prohibited "naked short selling" of the securities of
particular financial institutions. Naked short selling refers to the practice of selling
securities without actually buying them before hand, or determining that they can be
borrowed. The SEC believes that panic sales lead to falls in price to levels that are
significantly lower than that to which a normal supply-demand relationship would lead.
Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments,
Exchange Act, Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379, 42,380 (proposed July 21,
2008) (notice). The BaFin has also prohibited this practice on the basis of §4(1) WpHG,
and the German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schauble intends to introduce similar
prohibition on the Federal level. See BAFIN, ALLGEMEINVERFOGUNG DER BAFIN VOM
21.09.2008 ZUM VERBOT VON LEERVERKAUFEN (2008) (Ger.).
34 WpHG § 31(7) (transposing Art. 19(6) of the MiFID).
35 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHE (hereinafter BT] 19/1952 (Ger.).
36 Failures to deliver occur if an investor or its broker-dealer do not deliver sold
shares within three days. Following new SEC rules, failures to deliver in all equity
securities have decreased by approximately fifty-seven percent since the fall of 2008.
See SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency,
SEC Press Release No. 2009-172 (July 27, 2009).
37 "Stellungnahme zum Regierungsentwurf flir ein Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegen
missbrauchliche Wertpapier- und Derivategeschiifte." Letter from Thomas M.J. M6llers,
Dominique Christ & Andreas Harrer to Volker Wissing, Chairman of the Finance
Committee, Deutschen Bundestags (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.jura.uniaugsburg.de.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

66

[Vol. XXXVI

Alongside these developments, more transparency must be
created. Further-reaching reporting duties should definitely be
introduced, as Section 31 of WpHG does not sufficiently express
the dangers presented by financial futures trading."8 Therefore, the
abolition of Section 37 et seq. of WpHG, which warned about
particularly dangerous futures trades until October 31, 2007, and
2002. Prior to 2002, WpHG even imposed writing requirements,"
constituting a step backwards at the cost of investor protection.
Retail investors should be able to get an overview of the risk they
are entering into. A development to celebrate, on the other hand,
is the recent decision of the Federal Court of Justice that granted
an award of damages because the investor was not made aware of
the risk of total loss of investment.40
A stronger classification of risks would also be helpful. Not
every investor is aware of the danger of the Prime Standard. More
transparency in complex products is definitely needed, especially
for derivatives and certificates. A short information sheet that
provides more than the price history of the product could be
helpful.4 1 A draft bill has meanwhile been introduced in this
context.4 2 Particular risk should be presented, not just in a

See WpHG § 31.
On the legal history, see GERHARD ROTH, KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WPHG
(Heribert Hirte & Thomas M.J. M6llers eds., Carl Heymanns 2007) (commentary on §
38
39

37d

1

19); WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ

(Andreas

Fuchs ed.,

C.H.

Beck 2009)

(commentary on § 37e and § 37g 92).
40 BGHjudgment of 14 July 2009 - BFI Bank, WERTPAPIER-MrrEILUNGEN 1674
(2009) (Ger.).
41 There is a similar product disclosure statement with insurance products. See,
e.g., Verordnung Uber Informationspflichten bei Versicherungsvertrsigen [VVG-lnfoV],
Dec. 18, 2007, BGBL. I at 3006, § 4 (Ger.). See also BUNDESMINISTERIUMS FOR
LANDWIRTSCHAFT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [BMELV] [THE GERMAN
MINISTRY OF NUTRITON, AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], ANFORDERUNGEN
AN FINANZVERMITTLER - MEHR QUALITAT, BESSERE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 62 (2008) (Ger.);
ERNAHRUNG,

Volker Land & Andreas Kiihne, Anlegerschutz und Finanzkrise- noch mehr Regeln? Zu den Gesetzesinitiativen des BMJ und des BMiELV u.a. im Rahmen des Gesetzes zur
Neuregelung der Rechtsverhdltnisse bei Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen
und zur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeit von Ansprichen von Anlegern aus
Falschberatung (SchVG), 28 WERTPAPIER-MITTELUNGEN [WM] 1301, 1303 (2009)

(Ger.) (skeptical of this "rather counterproductive" position).
42 See Diskussionsentwurffir ein Gesetz zur Starkung des Anlegerschutzes und
Verbesserung der Funktionsfdhigkeit des Kapitalmarktes, BUNDESMINISTERIUM
FINANZEN (May 3, 2010, 10:01AM),

DER
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standardized form sheet, but also in the written record of financial
advice, to ensure that specific risks have been expressly named.
2. Information on Listed Companies andInformation Floods
a. Information Floods
Numerous reporting duties exist for listed companies.4 3 In
recent years, these duties of disclosure have been extended
extensively: one remembers the introduction of quarterly, halfyearly and yearly financial records, ad hoc reporting, reporting of
"directors" dealings," transparency of financial interests, etc.
However, it appears more and more that the limits of disclosure
duties have been reached. They not only burden the company with
high costs, but also lead to an insurmountable information
overload4 which operates, rather, to the disadvantage of investors.
b. Bounded Rationality - Summary

The results of behavioral finance research can be applied here.
They point to the limited understanding and informationprocessing capability of investors. 45 An approach to solving
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn 1940/DE/BMF Startseite/Service/Downlo
ads/Abt _VII/DiskEGesetz AnlegerschutzVerbesserung_2OFunktionalitC3 A4t
20Finanzm C3 A4rkte,templateld=raw,property-publicationFile.pdf.
43 For a graphic overview, see THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, AD-HOC-PUBLIZITAT § 2, T
50 (Thomas M.J. M6llers & Klaus Rotter eds., C.H. Beck 2003).
44 See
generally GOODYEAR ROGER & REKHA AGARWALA-ROGERS,
COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 90 (Free Press 1976); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand
Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replicaiton and Extension, 1 J. OF
CONSUMER RES. 33 (1974); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer
Decision Making, 8 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982); Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections
on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. OF
CONSUMER RES. 436 (1984). On capital market law, see generally Paula J. Dalley, The
Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089
(2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Investors, IPOs and the Internet, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L. J. 767, 770 (2008); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and its Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003); Susanna K. Ripken, The Dangersand
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to
Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006).
45 See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 81 (Free Press,
1957); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL
FINANCE 10 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000); W. G. Chase & Herbert A. Simon,

Perception in Chess, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 55, 76 (1973); Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A BehaviouralApproach to Law and
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problems in the capital markets could be to avoid misleading or
confusing information 4 6 and to reduce the overall quantity of
information. This would require the abolition of the yearly
document under Section 10 of WpPG, though this would save but
negligible costs and an overview of the yearly financial
information of the company seems sensible as an investor relations
measure. Revision of the yearly and half-yearly balances is also
needed. These balances are not even read, let alone understood,
by retail investors.47 What is required here is "translation"
assistance, information that is simple and easy to understand.
Currently, the legislature requires the production of a summary of
prospectus information under Section 5(2) WpPG. This duty
should be carried over to the secondary market. In the future, the
yearly report is to be accompanied by a "short financial report,"48
to enable the comprehension of this important corporate
information by investors better than has hitherto been the case.4 9
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); George A. Miller, The Magical Number
Seven, Plus or Minus Two, 63 PSCYHOLOGY REVIEW 81 (1956); Andreas Oehler,
Behavioural Finance - Theoretische, empirische und experimentelle Befunde under
Markt-relevanz, 48 BANK ARCHIV [BA] 978, 989 (2000) (Ger.); Robert J. Shiller, From
Efficient Markets to BehavioralFinance,J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 83; Herbert A.
Simon, A Behavioural Theory of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. OF EcoN. 99 (1955)
(foundational work); see also LARS KLOHN, KAPITALMARKT, SPEKULATION UND
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE (Duncker Humboldt Verlag 2006); WOLFGANG SCHON & ROLF

STORNER, FESTSCHRIFT FOR CLAUS-WLIHELM CANARIS (Andreas Heldrich, Jirgen Pr61ss
& Ingo Koller eds., C.H. Beck 2007).
46 On the misuse of ad hoc reporting in the year 2000 and the reaction of the
legislature with the introduction of §15(2) WpHG, see BAFIN, EMITTENTENTLEITFADEN
59 (2005) (Ger.); see also WERTPAPLERHANDELSGESETZ (Otto Schmidt, 2009)
(commentary on § 15, 199). See also WpHG § 31(2) (introduced for securities trading
companies on the basis of Art. 19(2) MiFID).
47 Id.

48 WpHG-E §37v(2).
49 In the United Kingdom, such financial reports have existed since 1995. See The
National Archives, The Companies (Summary Financial Statement) Regulations 1995
(Dec. 31, 1995), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksil995/2092/contents/made. This has
been accepted on a voluntary basis by, for example, the BASF S.E. with the BASF
Compact, availableat
http://berichte.basf.de/basfir/copsfiles/de/2008/kompakt/14586BASFKompakt_2008.p
df; cf Thomas M.J. M611ers & Eva Kemchen, Information Overload am KapitalmarktPlddoyer zur Einflihrung eines Kurzfinanzberichts auf empirischer,psychologischer und
UND
UNTERNEHMENSFOR
ZEITSCHRIFT
rechtsvergleichender Basis, 40
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] (forthcoming Feb. 2011) (Ger.).
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Besides the base price information, securities service providers
could provide clients with short "information sheets" in the course
of investment advisory service that are more tailored to the clients'
needs."0
IV. Financial Services of Financial Intermediaries
1. Selected Abuses ofFinancialIntermediaries
a. Rating Agencies
Rating
Even today material deficits exist in this area."
agencies give ratings that are substantially too positive on
structured financial products (collateralized debt obligations or
CDOs) and operate with extensive conflicts of interests." These
arise primarily because the same agencies are involved first in
structuring products and then rating them."
b. FinancialAnalysts and Journalists
In contrast to the USA, retail investors in Germany do not
generally have access to financial analyses. They turn to third
parties, for example journalists, for analysis summaries. In terms
of content, financial analyses must name the author and disclose
any conflicts of interest. Journalists in Germany fall foul of this
requirement on a regular basis at present.5 4

M61lers, Europdische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im
50 See
KapitalmarktrechtVollharmonisierung,Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des
Lamfalussy- Verfahrens als Mittel zur Etablierungvon Standards,supranote 5.
51 See Thomas M.J. M61lers, Credit RatingAgencies under New US and EU Law ImportantSteps or Much Ado aboutNothing?, 4 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 477 (2009).
52 Id.
53 Id.

54 Accord. THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WPHG (Carl
Heymanns 2007) (commentary on §34b 234); Thomas M.J. M611ers, Efficiency as a
Standard in Capital Market Law - The Application of Empirical and Economic
Arguments for the Justification of Civil Law, Criminal Law and Administrative Law
Sanctions, EUROPEAN Bus. L. REv. 243 (2009).

Concurring, see INGO KOLLER,

WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Heinz-Dieter Assmann & Uwe Schneider eds., Cologne,
Otto Schmidt 2009) (commentary on §34b T 73); see also ULRICH GORES, HANDBUCH
KAPITALMARKTINFORMATION (Mathias Habersack, Peter Mtllbert & Michael Schlitt eds.,
C.H. Beck 2009) (commentary on §24, T 176).
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c. Investment Services Providers
It is certainly positive for investors that, at the level of
European law, investment advisers are obliged to make themselves
familiar with the wishes and financial situation of the investor the principle of "know your customer." It is also positive for
investors that advice is now to be documented in written form
under Section 34(2a) clauses 3-5 of WpHG."
It remains doubtful, however, whether the German legislature
has competence at all to create a duty to keep records of this sort.56
And there exist many unresolved questions: the banks and
financial advisors are not allowed to carry out the transactions
planned in the consultation until the client has received the written
protocol. However, particularly for investment advice, time can
be of the essence. The production and communication of written
advice can, at times, simply be too slow; who then bears the risk
of market conditions that change in the meantime? Beyond this,
the reversal of the burden of proof against the banks in the case of
an action to challenge the memorandum hides several material
risks, which could manifest themselves as outright abuses. The
client has one week in which to challenge the protocol after its
receipt. As the bank bears the onus of proof, the client could
easily impugn the advice given, should market prices happen to
change in that supervening period. The bank would then have to
discharge the onerous burden of proving that the written advice
was neither incomplete nor incorrect. The client should also be
given the opportunity to waive the need for a written protocol." In
55 Comparable duties existed before under §6(1) II and §61(1) II VVG. However,
these are substantially less extensive. See Michael Bbhm, Regierungsentwurf zur
Verbesserung der Durchsetzbarkeitvon Ansprichen aus Falschberatung,6 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR BANK- UND KAPETALMARKTRECHT [hereinafter BKR] 221, 224 (2009).
56 See Thomas M.J. M6llers & Thomas Wenninger, Stellungnahme im
Rechtsausschuss als Gutachterdes Deutschen Bundestages zum Regierungsentwurfeines
Gesetzes zur Neuregelung der Rechtsverhdltnisse bei Schuldverschreibungen aus
Gesamtemissionenundzur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeitvon Anspriichen von Anlegern
aus Falschberatung,Apr. 29, 2009, available at www.thomas-moellers.de (Ger.); see
also THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, VOLLHARMONISIERUNG IM PRIVATRECHT 247 (Beate Gsell
& Carsten Herresthal eds., Mohr Siebeck 2009); Michael B3hm, supra note 55, at 228;
Dieter Leuering & Dirk Zetsche, Die Reform des Schuldverschreibungs- und
Anlageberatungsrechts - (Mehr) Verbraucherschutz im Finanzmarktrecht? NEUE
JURISTISCHE WoCHENSCHRIFT 2856, 2859 (2009).
57 Michael Bthm, Regierungsentwurfzur Verbesserung der Durchsetzbarkeit von
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such cases, investor protection overshoots the mark and leads to a
disproportionate disadvantage for the banks.
Beyond this, many banking and investment services providers
are capable of optimization. It is a statutory requirement that
information and advice be provided with the required level of
expertise." However, this has not been concretized further by
statute, and often 16 to 30 year old bank employees give
customers important advice - a task clearly beyond their
capacity. 9 Meanwhile, the German legislature created a new
proposal to ensure that the quality of the adviser is supervised."o
The MiFID concretizes financial services and creates a greater
degree of legal certainty. At the expense of investor protection,
and to this extent in a step backwards, it expressly allows
In
"discount brokers" and standardized disclosure forms.'
practice, hybrids exist between asset management and investment
advisory services. To this group belong the so-called "grey" asset
management and secondary advice after an initial investment. It is
unclear to what extent these sorts of dealings give rise to judicial
control.62
Further, conflicts of interest exist because banks usually sell

Anspriichen aus Falschberatung,6 BKR 221, 222 (2009) (F.R.G.).
58 See WpHG § 31(1), No. 1.
Leuering & Dirk Zetsche, Die Reform des
59 See generally Dieter
Schuldverschreibungs- und Anlageberatungsrechts - (Mehr) Verbraucherschutz im
Finanzmarktrecht?,39 N.J.W. 2856, at 2861 (2009) (F.R.G.) (discussing how branch
consultants are directed by business managers and have no access to finance experts).
60 Diskussionsentwurf fir ein Gesetz zur Stdrkung des Anlegerschutzes und
Verbesserung der Funktionsfdhigkeit des Kapitalmarktes, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER
FINANZEN (May 11, 2010),
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn 19408/DE/Wirtschaftundverwaltung/G
eld und _Kredit/AktuelleGesetze/DiskE Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz201
0.html.
61 On this point, see THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WPHG,
commentary §31, T 195 (1997); see also WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, commentary
§§31-37(a), T 70 (Andreas Fuchs ed., 2009).
62 Thomas
M.J.
Mllers,
Vermdgensbetreuungsvertrag,
graue
Vermdgensverwaltung und Zweitberatung - Vertragstypen zwischen klassischer
Anlageberatung und Verm6gensverwaltung, 3 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 93
(2008) (F.R.G.); see also VOLLHARMONISIERUNG IM PRIVATRECHT 247, 265 (Beate Gsell
and Carsten Herresthal eds., 2009); WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 19,

commentary §31,
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their own products. Reported judgments on kick-backs6 3 only
cover one aspect of this problem. Although the Federal Court of
Justice postulates the avoidance of conflicts of interest as a general
principle,' it has not found such a conflict in cases where a bank
only recommends its in-house products."
This authority
contradicts the "no conflicts" model, whereby financial services
providers are bound to deal in the best interests of their clients.6 6
The market for fee-based advice from disinterested advisors who
can inform investors neutrally about a range of different
investment forms is still remarkably small.67 Insurance law
provisions are more advanced in this regard - under Section
60(2) VVG, insurance brokers must disclose the limited selection
of products they offer.6 ' A similar obligation would not be an
unreasonable imposition on banks.
Banks, as financial intermediaries, also owe a minimum degree
of disclosure, which takes the form of standardized disclosure in
brochures. It should be considered insufficient when no current
63 BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [hereinafter BGH], Dec. 19, 2000, 146 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [hereinafter BGHZ] 235 241) (Ger.); 170
BGHZ 226 (234) (regarding Kick Back II); BGH Jan. 20, 2009, 9 WERTPAPIERMrERLUNGEN [WM] 405, 406, 2009 (Ger.) (regarding Kick Back III); 27 WM 1274
(Ger.) (regarding Kick Back IV); HIRTE & MOLLERS, supra note 39, commentary §31, 1
144.
64 See BGH, Jan. 20, 2009, supra note 64, at 406. Reference to HIRTE & MOLLERS,
supra note 39, commentary § 31, T 23, does not apply with such generality. See Mathias
Haas, Case Note on BGH judgment of 16 June 2009, (2009) LMK 277068.
65 BGH Dec. 19, 2006, 11 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [hereinafter ZIP]

518 (520), 2007 (Ger.); Fuchs, supra note 39, commentary §31, 79; see also Frank A.
Schafer & Ulrike Schafer, Zur Frage der Aufkldrungspflicht der anlageberatendenBank
im Zusammenhang mit der Zahlung von Rfickvergiitungen durch eine
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft,4 BKR 163, 164 (2007) (Ger.).
66 WpHG § 31; For a critical assessement, see Ingo Koller, Zu den Grenzen des
Anlegerschutzes

bei

Interessenkonflikten,

ZEITSCHRIFr

FOR

BANKRECHT

UND

BANKWIRTSCHAFT [hereinafter ZBB] 197, 198 (2007); Ingo Koller in Heinz-Dieter
Assmann, and Uwe Schneider (eds.), Wertpapierhandelsgesetz(Otto Schmidt, Cologne
2009) (commentary on §31, 1 134).
67 See Marco Habschick, et al., Anforderungen an Finanzvermittler - mehr
Qualitat, bessere Entscheidungen, BUNDESMIMSTERIUMS FOR ERNAHRuNG,
LANDWIRTSCHAFT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [BMELV], 152 (Sept. 2008) (Ger.),
http://www.bmelv.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/379922/publicationFile/42905/StudieFinan
zvermittler.pdfjsessionid=F237 OB2E1310E6FCFE482F73C38955C5 (last visited Oct.
26, 2010).
68 See Council Directive 2002/92, art. 12(1)(e)(ii) and (iii), 2003 O.J. (L 9) 9 (EC).
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market price is provided in online brokering services. In such
cases, the investor is often forced to estimate instead of being able
to limit overly large spreads through the use of a stop-loss order."
2. FiduciaryDuties ofFinanceIntermediariesand Other
Market Participants
One thing that stands out is that the contractual duties of a
financial intermediary only apply towards the company's
principal, the customer, but not towards third parties. While
damages claims against banks are not infrequent, a gap exists
where liability to third parties may be justified, for example, where
financial analysis and rating agencies give ratings or
recommendations that are far too positive.
In corporate law, the managerial organs of the company owe a
duty of loyalty to the company.70 This fiduciary duty arises from
the special power that company managers have over the capital of
others." This concept also applies directly to asset management 72
and to investment funds."
In general, bank business is
characterized according to German civil law as Auftragsrecht or
agency law, by which the bank deals in its own name for the
benefit of the client-principal, and is bound to put its own interests
behind those of the principal.74 Whether this falls below the true
fiduciary standard of duty, and to what extent, requires further
dogmatic inquiry. Section 31(1) No. 1 of WpHG has also
extended the principle of furthering another party's interest to
relationships that are not really for the benefit of that other party
for example, with the provision of credit."
It is unclear whether the duties of financial intermediaries, who
69 See generally Banking and Stock Glossary, DEUTSCHE BANK (Nov. 9, 2010, 7:00
PM), http://www.db.com/lexikon/lexikonde/content/index_e_1 178.htm (defining a
stop-loss order and briefly explaining its use in limiting investors' losses).
70 See Thomas M.J. M61lers, Treuepflichten und Interessenkonflikte bei VorstandsundAufsichtsratsmitgliedern,in HANDBUCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 387 (2003).
71 Id.
72 For a detailed treatment, see ROLF SETHE, ANLEGERSCHUTZ IM RECHT DER
VERMOGENSVERWALTUNG 149, 618 (2005).

73 Investmentgesetz §22; see also Pfandbriefgesetz §7.
74 KLAUS J. HoPT & ADOLF BAUMBACH, HANDELSGESETZBUCH, §347,

Beck 2008).
75 HIRTE & MOLLERS, supra note 39, commentary

§ 31, $ 87.

30 (C.H.
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often stand between investors and listed companies, can be
transferred in weaker form to the company itself. On its face, this
approach is to be rejected, as listed companies do not usually act
in the interest of others, that is, their investors. Fundamentally,
contractual relationships are absent, so that only delictual liability
comes into question.76 It is conceivable that listed companies
might be held subject to duties comparable to the professional
liability" of accountants, tax advisors and lawyers, as on the
capital market a certain trust is put in the expertise of
professionals." In the case of ad hoc reporting requirements, a
particular duty is imposed on the management of a listed company
because it bears a particular responsibility as "information
The information provided by the company
monopolists.""
influences the market price of its securities, but it also influences
third party analyses. Do the number and nature of duties deemed
to apply and the question of fault influence this role?o This
reasoning can be extended to yearly and half-yearly financial
reporting, because the information content in these reports is
significantly higher than content derived from ad hoc reporting."
76 For a survey of the argument, see HIRTE & MOLLERS, supra note 39, commentary
§§ 37b-37c, 18; see also SETHE, supra note 72, §§ 37b-37c, 18.
77 See Klaus J. Hopt, Nichtvertragliche Haftung ausserhalb von Schadens- und
Bereicherungsausgleich,183 ARCHIV FOR PRESSERECHT 578, 608 (1983) (Ger.). See
ALEXANDER HELLGARDT, KAPITALMARKTDELIKTSRECHT: HAFTUNG VON EMrTENTEN,
BIETERN, ORGANWALTERN UND MARKTINTERMEDIAREN- GRUNDLAGEN, SYSTEMATIK,
EINZELFRAGEN 218, 436 (2008) (arguing that, on the basis of a sui generis legal
relationship, false information for self-enrichment or targeted exclusion of corporate
governance mechanisms can crystallise into a capital markets law duty of loyalty). For a
discussion of the Infonnatec decision, see, e.g., Thomas M.J. Mollers and Franz Clemens
Leisch, Haftung von Vorstdnden gegeniiber Anlegern wegen fehlerhafter Ad-hocMeldungen nach § 826 BGB, WM 1648, 1654 (2001); see also HIRTE & MOLLERS, supra
note 39, commentary §§ 37b-37c, 119; M61lers, AD-HOC-PUBLIZITAT, supra note 43, §3
IN 32, 47; cf Oliver Rieckers, Haftung des VorstandsflirfehlerhafteAd-hoc-Meldungen
de lege lata und de lege ferenda, BETRIEBS-BERATER [1213 (2002) (Ger.); Rildiger
Krause, Ad-hoc-Publizitdt und haftungsrechtlicher Anlegerschutz, 6 ZGR 799, 823
(2002).
78 See id.
79 M61lers, supra note 37, at 282-83.
80 On the misuse of this information instrument, see Fuchs, supra note 39, at
34; Patrick C. Leyens, Unabhdngigkeit der
commentary on §37b and §37c
Informationsintermedidre zwischen Vertrag und Markt, in PERSPEKTIVEN DES
WIRTSCHAFTSREcHTS 423 (Harald Baum et al. eds., 2008).
81 The Federal Court of Justice emphasizes correctly that documents such as the
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As such, this must apply a fortiori to the duties arising from
regular reporting requirements. The introduction of a "balancesheet oath" has made the significance of the yearly financial report
to the investing public even clearer.8 2
The elements of the generally applicable insider trading and
price manipulation provisions are completely vague. Does it
increase the illegality of the action when professional market
participants fulfill an element of proscribed conduct, for example
price manipulation, or does it only have an influence on
sentencing considerations? Put differently, is there a layman's
discount for insider traders?83
V. Supervision and Enforcement
1. Public Supervision
a. Efficiency at the European Level
Finally, some mention ought to be made of supervision. Here,
too, we allow ourselves inefficient structures, with twenty-seven
national supervisory authorities in Europe. Many of these are far
too small to be equal partners with global players on the financial
markets such as the three largest credit rating agencies.84
Meanwhile, attempts have been made to create new European
supervision structures and to make European Law more efficient.
In this context, it becomes relevant to consider which problems are
to be solved on the international, European or national level."
yearly financial reports or the prospectus have a higher information value than ad hoc
reporting. See BGH, July 19, 2005, 160 BGHZ 134, 138 (Ger.).
82 WpHG §37v(2) No. 3, §37w(3) No. 3, §37y No. 1; HANDELSGESETZBUCH
[hereinafter HGB], §264(2), sentence 3, §289(1), sentence 5. However, the sanctions
imposed can now differ greatly from the criminal provisions of §331 No. 3a HGB to a
lack of any sanction at all. See Fuchs, supra note 39 (Andreas Fuchs et al. eds.)
(commentary on §37v - §37z T 15); Peter 0. Millbert & Steffen Steup, Das zweispurige
Regime nach Inkrafttreten des TUG, 20 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT

[hereinafter NZG] 761, 769 (2007) (Ger.).
83 If an investor organization makes a public statement, higher duties to conduct
proper research exist to avoid the creation of rumors than when retail investors express a
position on securities in an online forum.
84 For a critical commentary, see Thomas M.J. M611ers, Regulierung von
Ratingagenturen,64 JURISTENZErrUNG 861, 869 (2009) (Ger.).
85 Concerning the problems in dealing with derivates, see supra note 34. European
Member States such as France criticized Germany's single-handed national approach.
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b. Efficiency at the NationalLevel
Banking and capital markets law is a complex constellation of
public law, criminal law and civil law structures. Cooperation
between the BaFin and the public prosecutors is still hindered by
the fact that the corporate departments of the latter possess
insufficient staff and expertise. In the future, the capacity of the
public prosecutors to sanction insider trading and market
manipulation offences with criminal proceedings should be
enhanced to reflect the importance of the stock exchange. Finally,
the number of BaFin employees must be increased.86
2. Civil Law Sanctions
a. InadequateState of the Law
Recent developments in European competition law make clear
that besides public law, the civil law actions of private individuals
are indispensable to sanctioning violations and ensuring an open
market economy with free competition."
If one regards
functioning capital markets as a legal value comparable to
functional competition, it is one that requires enhanced protection
under civil law in order to build the required confidence in the
capital markets. What is certainly positive is the abolition of the
special statute of limitations in Section 37a WpHG" and the
Frankreich irritiert iiber deutschen Alleingang, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,
May 19, 2010, availableat
http://www.faz.net/s/RubEC1ACFE1EE274C81BCD3621EF555C83C/Doc-E27EEBDF
4D87C4880AE64DB93DA974EC5-ATp-Ecommon-Scontent.html (Ger.).
86 The annual reports or Jahresberichteof the BaFin refer to some cases - still
capable of a rather quick inventory, being modest in number. See, e.g., BaFin, supra
note 16, '06 Jahresbericht der Bundesanstalt fairFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,163
(2006); BaFin, '07 Jahresbericht der Bundesanstalt firFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
172 (2007); BaFin, '08 Jahresberichtder Bundesanstalt
firFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,154-55 (2008).
87 Daniel Zimmer & Hans Logemann, Der Private Rechtsschutz im Kartellrecht
Zum Weif/buch der Kommission iber Schadensersatzklagen wegen Verletzung des EGWettbewerbrechts, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EURoPMSCHEs PRIVATRECHT (2009) 489 (Ger.);
Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 (April 2, 2008); see Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 4; see also ANTrl AINE ET AL., THE
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE 387 (Thomas M.J. M6llers & Andreas
Heinemann eds., 2007).
88 WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ, supra note 39, at commentary on §37a T 4, 12;
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introduction of the Capital Markets Class Action Statute
(KapMuG). Otherwise, however, much still lies in a sorry state.
A specially provided cause of action only lies for incorrect ad hoc
reporting. Because of the high test required to prove causation, it
is hardly used. Other reporting duties are all too often denied the
protective legislative intent required for a cause of action.89
b. Introduction ofFurtherReaching Causes ofAction
The legislature attempted to create a normative structure for
comprehensive liability for false capital market information two
legislative periods ago with the Capital Markets Information
Liability Statute (KapInHG). Even if the liability envisioned in
this bill was excessive,9 0 it represented a good starting point for
further legislative initiatives.9 1 European law also requires the
introduction of causes of action enabling claims in damages for
incorrect capital market information.92 A purely internal cause of
LEISCH , supra note 8, at §37a 33; BOhm, supra note 55, at 227; Volker Lang &
Andreas Otto Kilhne, Anlegerschutz und Finanzkrise - noch mehr Regeln? - Zu den
Gesetzesinitiativen des BMJ und des BMELV u.a im Rahmen des Gesetzes zur
Neuregelung der Rechtsverhaltnisse bei Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen
und zur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeit von Anspriichen von Anlegern aus
Falschberatung [SchV], 28 WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN

1301,

1304 (2009) (Ger.);

Leuering & Zetsche, supra note 56, at 2858.
89 See the recent BGH judgment of Feb. 19, 2008, NEuE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1734, 1735 14, §34b and §37v of the WpHG.
90 See, e.g., HELLGARDT, supra note 77; Klaus J. HoPT & HANS- CHRISTIAN VOIGT,
PROSPEKT- UND KAPITALMARKTINFORMATIONSHAFTUNG:

RECHT UND REFORM IN DER

EUROPAISCHEN UNION, DER SCHWEIZ UND DEN USA 9, 107 (Klaus J. Hopt & HansChristian Voigt eds., 2005); TILMAN WEICHERT, DER ANLEGERSCHADEN BEI
FEHLERHAFTEN KAPITALMARKTPUBLIZITAT (2008); Thomas M.J. M6llers, Die Infomatec-

Entscheidungen des BGH -

Marksteine auf dem Weg zu einem Kapitalmarki-

informationshaftungsgesetz,60 JURISTENZEITUNG 75, 79 (2005) (Ger.).

91 Die Beschlisse des 64. Deutschen Juristentages Berlin 2002, DEUTSCHER
JURISTENTAGS, 41 (Sept. 20, 2002), http://www.djt.de/files/djt/64/beschluesse.pdf,
Patrick C. Leyens, German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future
Challenges, 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1407, 1416 (2005), available at

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol06Nol0/PDF-Vol_06_No_10_14071418 DevelopmentsLeyens.pdf.
92 See Council Directive 2006/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2006 Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC,
86/635/EEC, and 91/674/EEC, art. 50b, 2006 OJ. (L 224/1); Council Directive
2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers
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action within the company, as Section 93 AktG provides, cannot
be regarded as sufficient to meet this requirement of community
law in several respects. European law remains, as a result,
incorrectly transposed in German law to this day.9 3 De lege
ferenda, the introduction of a claim in damages for incorrect
quarterly, half-yearly and yearly reports should be considered.9 4
VI. Legislation and Legal Methodology in Capital Market
Law
1. The Lamfalussy Process,FullHarmonizationand Further
Gaps
The Lamfalussy Process brings about full harmonization
without calling it by name. Thus, full harmonization should be
assumed by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive,"

Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending
Council Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 7(28), 2004 O.J. (L390/38) 17; Council Directive
2003/7 1/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the
Prospectus to be Published When Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to
Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 6(2), 2003 O.J. (L345/64); Fourth
Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty
on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11.
93 This applies, for example, to Article 7 of the Transparency Directive
2004/109/EC which reads:
Member States are to ensure that responsibility for the information to be
drawn up and made public in accordance with Articles 4, 5, 6 and 16 lies at
least with the issuer or its administrative, management or supervisory
bodies and shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative
provisions on liability apply to the issuers, the bodies referred to in this
article or the persons responsible within the issuers.
Directive 2004/109, supra note 92. See also MICHAEL BRELLOCHS, PUBLIZITAT UND
HAFTUNG VON AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN IM SYSTEM DES EuRoPAIscHEN

95 (2005).
94 On the current state of this debate, see, e.g., supra note 39, at commentary on
§37b and §37c 24; Fuchs, supra note 39, at commentary on §37b and §37c $ 69.
95 On the MiFID, see Thomas M.J. M61lers, Zur 'Unverziiglichkeit' einer Ad-hocKAPTTALMARKTREcHTs

Mitteilung im Kontext in, FESTSCHRIFT FOR NORBERT HORN 473, 485 (Andreas Schliter
et al. eds., 2006); TOBIAS BUCHMANN, UMSETZUNG VOLLHARMONISIERTER RICHTLINIEN

95 (2008); Fuchs (ed.), supra note 39, at commentary on §31 254; Roman Jordans, Die
Umsetzung der MiFID in Deutschland und die Abschaffung des § 37d WpHG, 37
WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN

1827 (2007) (Ger.); Carsten Herresthal, Die Pflicht zur

Aupldrung iiber Riickvergiltungen und die Folgen ihrer Verletzung, ZBB, at 348, 352
(2009) (Ger.). Roman A. Kasten, Das neue Kundenbild des § 31 a WpHG -
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Market Abuse Directive, the Prospectus Directive,97 and the
Transparency Directive.9 8 In this process, the jurisdiction of the
ECJ to define unclear legal terms should also be considered. It is
unclear, however, what jurisdiction the ECJ has to determine the
level of harmonization brought about by an instrument when that
is left undefined. 9 This applies to another important question,
namely, the extent to which the national civil courts, along with
the duties arising from Section 31 et seq. of the WpHG, can
concretize questions left open such as the post-contractual duty of
advice.'o
Some are of the opinion that the national legislature is
competent to answer particular questions that are not expressly
dealt with.'o'
According to the opposing camp, recourse to
Umsetzungsprobleme nach MiFID & FRUG, 7 BKR 261, 267 (2007) (Ger.); Thomas
M.J. M6llers, Europaische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht Vollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des LamfalussyVerfahrens als Mittel zur Etablierung von Standards, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES
PRIVATRECHTat 480, 500 (2008) (Ger.); Tilman Weichert & Thomas Wenninger, Die
von
und
Aukldarungspflichten
der
ErkundigungsNeuregelung
WertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmengemdaS Art. 19 RiL 2004/30/EG (MiFID) und
Finanzmarkt-Richtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, 14 WERTPAPIER- MITTEILUNGEN 627, 628
(2007) (Ger.); On maximum harmonization, see Peter 0. Mfilbert, Anlegerschutz bei
Zertifikaten - Beratungspflichten, Offenlegungspflichten bei Interessenkonflikten und die
Anderungen durch das Finanzmarkt-Richtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz (FRUG), 25
WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 1149, 1157 (2007) (Ger.); Peter 0. Millbert, Auswirkungen
der MiFID-Rechtsakte jr Vertriebsvergiitungen im Effektengeschaft der Kreditinstitute,
172 ZEITSCHRIFT FIOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 170, 176

(2008) (Ger.).
96 CHRISTIAN BOCHE, DIE PFLICHT ZUR AD-HOC-PUBLIZITAT ALS BAUSTEIN EINES
INTEGEREN F[NANZMARKTs 85 (2005); BUCHMANN, supra note 95, at 100; THOMAS M.J.
MOLLERS, EUROPAISCHES FINANZMARKTRECHT 473, 485 (Norbert Horn ed., 2003);

M61lers, supra note 95, at 480; Millbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsakte ftir
Vertriebsvergutungenim Effektengeschaft der Kreditinstitute,supra note 95, at 18 1.
97 On the Prospectus Directive, see ELLIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES

MARKET 136 (2004); BUCHMANN,supra note 95; Milbert, supra note 95, at 181.
98 Holger Fleischer & Holger Schmolke, Das Anschleichen an eine bdrsennotierte
Aktiengesellschaft, NZG 11 (2008) (Ger.); Mtilbert, supra note 95, at 1157 (discussing
maximum harmonization); see also Millbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsaktefir
Vertriebsvergiltungenim Effektengeschaft der Kreditinstitute,supranote 95, at 182.
9 MIllers, Vollharmonisierungim Privatrecht,supra note 5, at 264.
100 See supra note 61.
lot See, e.g., RegE BT-Drs. 16/12814, at 28 on the question of professional

memoranda of advice; Thorsten Vo8, Geschlossene Fonds unter dem Rechtsregime der
Finanzmarkt-Richtlinie(MiFID), BKR 45, 48 (2007) (Ger.) (regarding undefined legal
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national civil law should be excluded in cases of maximum and
full harmonization.' 0 2 The fact that the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive expressly excludes civil law from its scope
of application stands against such a view."' According to an
intermediate opinion, one has to assume that the Directives
released within the framework of the Lamfalussy Process are in
the nature of regulatory law, and, to this extent, the national civil
law subsists and national provisions are applicable.' 04
Certain amendments to the Markets in FinancialInstruments
and Market Abuse directives should have brought about some
clarification at the first or second level on the important question
of civil claims. It is conceivable that a violation of the duties
under WpHG Section 31 et seq. could also give rise to a civil
claim in damages, as is the case under VVG Section 6(5).'0

In

terms).
102 Peter 0. Mfllbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsaktefir
Vertriebsvergiitungen im Effektengeschdft der Kreditinstitute, 172 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTscHAFrsREcHT [ZHR] 170, 183 (2008) (Ger.).
103 See Commission Directive 2006/73, Recital 37, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26, 29 (EC):
Without prejudice to the provisions of this Directive relating to the
production or dissemination of investment research, it is recommended that
producers of investment research that are not investment firms should
consider adopting internal policies and procedures designed to ensure that
they also comply with the principles set out in this Directive as to the
protection of the independence and objectivity of that research.
Commission Directive 2006/73, Recital 37, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26, 29 (EC).
104 See Ingo Koller, Die Abdingbarkeit des Anlegerschutzes durch Information im
europdischen Kapitalmarktrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ULRICH HUBER 821 (Theodor
Baums, Johannes Wertenbruch, and Marcus Lutter eds., 2006); THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS,
VOLLHARMONISIERUNG IM PRIVATRECHT 247, 264 (Beate Gsell and Carsten Herresthal,

eds., 2009); Thomas M.J. M6llers, Venndgensbetreuungsvertrag,graue
Vermegensverwaltung und Zweitheratung - Vertragstypen zwischen klassischer
Anlageberatung und Vermgensverwaltung, 3 WERTPAPIER-MITTELUNGEN [WM] 93
(2008); Peter 0. Milbert, Anlegerschutz bei Zertifikaten - Beratungspflichten,
Offenlegungspflichten bei Interessenkonflikten und die Anderungen durch das
Finanzmarkt-Richtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz[FRUG], 25 WM 1149, 1157 (2007); Peter 0.
Milbert, Auswirkungen der MiFID-Rechtsaktefar Vertriebsvergitungen im
Effektengeschdft der Kreditinstitute, 172 ZHR 170, 183 (2008); Rildiger Veil,
Vermagensverwaltung und Anlageberatung im neuen Wertpapierhandelsrecht - eine
behutsame Reform der Wohlverhaltensregeln?ZBB 34, 41 (2008).
105 See Volker Lang and Andreas Otto Kflhne, Anlegerschutz und Finanzkrise noch mehr Regeln? - Zu den Gesetzesinitiativen des BMJ und des BMELV u.a im
Rechtsverhdltnisse bei
zur Neuregelung der
Gesetzes
des
Rahmen
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that case, at least civil-law sanctions would apply that standard.
Furthermore, it should be clarified to what extent civil law duties
can go farther than the Markets in FinancialInstruments Directive
expressly regulates. Finally, the successor authority to the CESR,
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), will be
established with the task of releasing binding technical standards,
0
This also
in consultation with the European Commission.o'
contributes to legal certainty on the European level.
2. Legal Methodology in the Application ofLaw
An attempt has been made in the literature to present a
systemic taxonomy of capital markets law with the internal and
external system of Karl Larenz.'0 o The methodology of the 1960s
was certainly helpful to create legal certainty after the confusion of
The methodological approach
the National Socialist period.'
now seems to be appropriate as a starting point in the
administration of justice, but seems largely outdated and as such
inappropriate in light of the following five considerations.
a. CapitalMarkets Law as an InterdisciplinaryField
It is beyond challenge that capital markets law has an
interdisciplinary profile, implemented through administrative law,
It is also well known that different
civil law and criminal law.'
methodological considerations are required for each of these
individual fields of law. In public law, for example, invasions of
the citizen's rights require a sufficient legal basis: in criminal law
the maxim nulla poena sine lege applies. Filling gaps with the

Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen und zur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeit
von Anspruichen von Anlegern aus Falschberatung[SchVG], 28 WM 130, 137 (2009).
106 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Council and of the
Parliament Establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, at 5, COM
(2009) 504 (Sept. 23, 2009). See also Thomas M.J. M611ers, Sources of Law in
European Securities Regulation - Effective Regulation, Soft Law and Legal Taxonomy
from Lamfalussy to Larosibre,in 10 EBOR (forthcoming 2010).
107 See generally KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 6
(1991).
108 BERND RUTHERS, UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG: ZUM WANDEL DES PRIVATRECHTS
IMNATIONALSOZIALISMUS (2005).
109 Heribert Hirte & Tobias Heinricht, Introduction to KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
WPHG9 107 (Heribert Hirte & Thomas M.J. Millers, eds., 2007).
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civil law can soon reach its limits. This can lead to disharmonious
interpretation." 0
b. Legal Development through Regulators and Private
Parties
To this comes the fact that broad areas of capital markets law
consist of the so-called non-binding internal administrative law of
national or European financial supervisory authorities"' or of
norms set by private bodies, such as the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the German Accountancy
Standards Committee (the DRCS)"l 2 or the Institut der
Wirtschaftsprtifer (IDW) S4 of the accountants for the production
of prospectuses. Here, too, the statutory interpretation methods of
the civil law cannot be transferred directly. Moreover it is highly
problematic whether, and to what extent private normative
instruments hold binding force and how this law interacts with
Also being considered is the proposition that
state law.' "
standards and recommendations are indirectly binding."14
110 See Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Introduction to WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETz 60-92
(Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe Schneider, eds., 2009); Hirte & Heinrich, supra note
118; SUSANNE KALSS, EUROPAISCHE METHODENLEHRE § 20,134 (Karl Riesenhuber, ed.,
2006); Andreas Cahn, Grenzen des Markt- und Anlegerschutzes durch das WpHG, 162
ZHR 1, 8 (1998). Cf Thomas M.J. M61lers & Sabrina Hailer, Systembriiche bei der
Anwendung strafrechtlicher Grundprinzipien auf das kapitalmarktrechtliche
Marktmanipulationsverbot, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR UWE SCHNEIDER ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG
(forthcoming 2011).
111 On the CESR, see generally Thomas M.J. Millers, Europdische Methoden- und
Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht- Vollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und
soft law im Rahmen des Lamfalussy- Verfahrens als Mittel zur Etablierungvon Standards
ZEUP 480 (2008); see GERALD SPINDLER AND JAN HUPKA, GELTUNG UND FAKTIZITAT
VON STANDARDS 17 (Thomas M.J. M6llers, ed., 2009); Jan Hupka, Kapitalmarktaufsicht
im Wandel - Rechtswirkungen der Empfehlungen des Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR) im deutschen Kapitalmarktrecht,29 WM 1351 (2009).
112 See HBG § 342(2).
113 Thomas M.J. M61lers, Sekundare Rechtsquellen - Eine Skizze zur
Vermutungswirkung und zum Vertrauensschutz bei Urteilen, Verwaltungsvorschriften
und privater Normsetzung, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HERBERT BUCHNER 649, 660 (JobstHubertus Bauer et al. eds., 2009). For a more in-depth analysis, see generally GELTUNG
For an
uND FAKTIZITAT VON STANDARDS 16 (Thomas M.J. M6llers ed., 2009).
interpretation of the IFRS, see Hanno Merkt, Introduction to KLAUS J. HOPT & ADOLF
BAUMBACH, HANDELSGESETZBUCH (C.H. Beck 2008) § 238, 1 135.
114 See Thomas M.J. M6llers, Sources of Law in European Securities Regulation Effective Regulation, Soft Law and Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to Larosidre, 10
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c. CapitalMarkets Law as EuropeanLaw and a
Research Areafor Studies in ComparativeLaw
German capital markets law is, to a large extent, European
law."' The WpHG incorporates, for example, the Market Abuse
Directive and the Markets in FinancialInstruments Directive into
German law, although the two directives have different audiences,
namely listed companies and banks. To draw parallels between
the two addressees on the basis of systematic considerations is
unconvincing when one considers that the Markets Abuse
Directive is concerned with all market participants and the
Markets in FinancialInstruments Directive is primarily concerned
with securities service providers. To this comes the ECJ's duty to
interpret European law independent from national provisions and
the national courts' duty to interpret national provisions in
accordance with directives."' Time and again, national courts
violate their duty to refer questions of European law to the ECJ."7
Some believe that European capital markets law is grossly
incomplete and incapable of any systematic approach. However,
from the German perspective, the goal remains valid to attempt a
systematization at the European level.
The financial crisis has made clearer exactly how global the
financial markets have become; the German Landesbanken bought
the toxic papers of American banks in quantity, and as a result
were forced to merge and only narrowly escaped bankruptcy. All
too often provisions of US law are adopted blindly. The
interpretation of European directives can often only work where
the origin of the rule in question is known and it can be compared
with the "mother" provision and cases applying it."' As such it is
EBOR (forthcoming 2010).
115 See, e.g., NORBERT HORN, EUROPAISciHES FINANZMARKTRECHT (2003).
116 See Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Introduction to HEINZ-DIETER AsSMANN AND UWE
SCHEIDER, WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ 1 96 (2009); Heribert Hirte & Tobias Heinrich,
Introduction to HERIBERT HIRTE & THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM

WPHG 60-92 (2007).
117 See, e.g., Thomas M.J. M6l1ers, Der BGH, die BaFin und der EuGH: Ad-hocPublizittit beim einvernehmlichen vorzeitigen Ausscheiden des Vorstandsvorsitzenden
Jiargen Schremp, NZG 330, 332 (2008) (Ger.). See also Joachim Vogel, Scalping als
Kurs- und MarktpreismanipulationNeue ZeitschriflirStrafrecht 252, 254 (2004).
118 See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Gutachten F flr den 64, DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG
(2002).
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always necessary to warn against the blind reception of US law.
d. Capital Markets and CapitalMarkets Law - the
InterdisciplinaryCharacterof CapitalMarkets Law
There remains one last criticism of the attempts at civil law
systematization. Capital markets aim for efficiency.1 19 Numerous
models are based on economic considerations. As such, the model
of homo economicus still underlies much of capital markets law.
This figure is a rational actor who processes all available
information before investing, so that the market always reflects the
correct price. With this model, however, bubbles cannot be
explained, nor can the phenomenon of limited informationprocessing capacity.'20 For this reason, what we need is not so
much the ability to fill gaps systematically, but rather find a
common language between the disciplines.12 ' This will allow us to
take hypotheses that are based on incorrect premises, and correct
them through the medium of law.

119 See generally Thomas M.J. M61lers, Effizienz als Mafistab des
Kapitalmarktrechts - Die Verwendung empirischer und konomischer Argumente zur
Begriindung zivil-, straf-und 6ffentlich-rechtlicherSanktionen, 208 DAS ARCHIV FOR DIE
CIvILLSTISCHE PRAxIs (AcP] 1 (2008). See also Johannes K6ndgen in Daniel Fleischer
and Holger Zimmer, Effizienz als Regelungsziel im Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht,
SUPPLEMENT TO ZHR, 100 (2009); Peter Sester, Zur Interpretation der
Kapitalmarkteffizienz in Kapitalmarktgesetzen, Finanzmarktrichtlinienund -standards,
38 ZGR 310, 310-13 (2009).
120 See infra Section 111.2.
121 This call has been made by Christoph M61lers. CH-RISTOPH MOLLERS,
Vorsichtsregulative, in 1 GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS § 3 42 (Wolfgang
Hoffinan-Riem et al. eds., 2006); MATTHIAS JESTAEDT, DAS MAG INDER THEORIE RICHTIG
SEIN 74 (2006) (explaining legal theory as a 'gatekeeper discipline' that determines
which ideas and theories from other disciplines are allowed into the inner sanctum of
See also Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die rechtswissenschaftliche
legal theory).
Methodendiskussion und die Bewdltigung des gesellschaftlichen Wandels, 64 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 60,

101 (2000) (calling for 'meta-dogmatik'); Stefan Grundmann, Methodenpluralismusals
Aufgabe - zur Legalitit von 6konomischen und rechtsethischen Argumenten in
Auslegung und Rechtsanwendung, 61 RABELSZ 423 (1997) (also calling for 'metadogmatik').

